The origins of Franco-Qatari relations

By Saoud AL-AHBABI Colonel at the General Staff of the Qatari Armed Forces

 

France and Qatar have maintained very close relations since the birth of the Qatari nation at the time of its independence in 1971. On that occasion, the new nation’s representative at the United Nations is said to have officially requested the Emirate’s membership of the UN in French. France was also one of the first countries to welcome a Qatari diplomatic mission, with the opening of the Qatari embassy in France in 1972. Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamed Al Thani subsequently strengthened this relationship by visiting France in 1974, when he bought a house in the south of France. It was also at this time that the Qatari royal family got into the habit of employing tutors from France so that the Al Thani children could learn French from an early age. To better understand the present, we need to delve a little deeper into history.

In fact, the first mention of the name « Qatar » appears in a version of the map by Ptolemy, the geographer and astronomer who lived in Alexandria in the second century AD, under the name of the fort « Katara »[1]. But Qatar only became an independent state some fifty years ago. This arid, sparsely populated peninsula, which was probably deserted by its inhabitants at certain periods in prehistory and history due to climatic changes that made water resources even more scarce, has nonetheless aroused the envy of its neighbours over the centuries, and then of the West due to its strategic position on the maritime routes linking Mesopotamia to the south of the Arabian Peninsula, and then those linking Europe to India. After enjoying relative prosperity thanks to fishing and the pearl trade on the coast, supplemented by nomadic livestock farming in the interior, Qatar sank into poverty after the pearling industry collapsed in the 1920s. But oil was discovered in the east of the Qatari peninsula at Dukhan in 1939. The Second World War delayed its commercial exploitation, which began in 1950. This brought in new revenue and prompted the British to fix the borders of their protectorate in the face of Saudi appetites.

On 3 September 1971, Qatar, a British protectorate, proclaimed its independence. At that time, France, which had been a colonial power, had already granted independence to its colonies in Asia and then Africa. It enjoyed rapid economic growth during the period known as the Trente Glorieuses[2] before the oil crisis of 1973, and General de Gaulle pursued an active foreign policy guided by the constant desire to guarantee France’s independence from other powers[3]. At the beginning of this chapter, after a review of Qatar’s history in the context of the Arabian Peninsula, I will look at British policy and the complicated relations between Qatar and Bahrain. In the remainder of the chapter, I will show why the new state avoided turning exclusively to its former colonial power or to the United States in the bipolar world of the Cold War and developed its links with France, which had a number of assets at its disposal to become a privileged partner of the new state.

The long road to the birth of the State of Qatar

The first archaeological evidence of human presence in Qatar dates back to the Palaeolithic[4]. From 1976 onwards, the first French archaeological missions excavated throughout the peninsula and discovered sites from different periods, not just in the western part of Qatar, which had been excavated in the 1950s by the Danes and then from 1973 by the British. The team led by Professor Jacques Tixier[5] unearthed a wealth of Neolithic material. It has also advanced our knowledge of the Bronze Age in Qatar. In addition to the Bronze Age sites unearthed by the archaeologists, thousands of cairns have been found in Iron Age sites concentrated on the west coast of the Qatar peninsula[6].

The discovery of ceramic shards dating from the end of the third millennium at Ras Abrouq, a cape on the west coast of Qatar, and the discovery of the Al Khor site north of Doha show that the inhabitants of Qatar were part of the culture of Dilmun, a city-state founded in the third millennium BC on the neighbouring island of Bahrain. C. on the neighbouring island of Bahrain, which occupied a strategic position on the trade routes between the Indus Valley and Mesopotamia, and whose sailors sailed their dhows on the Gulf, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. From that time onwards, the inhabitants of Qatar dived for pearls in the shallow waters of the Gulf. In 2022, archaeologists discovered a pearl more than 6,500 years old in a tomb in Wadi Al Debaian[7]. In addition to pearl fishing, Qatar also worked with murex, a shell from which purple is extracted, the colour of the national flag, as explained in a video from the Qatar National Museum[8].

A minor part of vast empires

Around 2,350 BC, the region of present-day Qatar came under the control of the empire of Sargon of Akkad, one of the first great Mesopotamian empires. Sargon’s successors maintained their power until around 2,200 BC.

Various foreign powers ruled the Gulf region from 1700 BC to 700 AD. First came the Assyrian Empire, then as Assyrian rule collapsed, the Babylonians gained strength. Around 600 BC, they conquered the Assyrian territories in the Gulf region, but did not control them for long. Within fifty years, the Persians had conquered Babylon and incorporated the Arabian Peninsula into their vast empire.

In 325 BC, Alexander the Great, the Macedonian conqueror, launched a Greek navy into the Persian Gulf. After his death, his empire was divided between four of his generals. Seleucus took charge of the territory encompassing Qatar, which prospered under his reign and that of his successors, the Seleucids. However, in 250 BC, the Parthians, a Persian power, drove the Greeks out of the Gulf. Persian hegemony over the Gulf reached its apogee in the third century AD, under the Sassanids, who ruled the region for around four centuries.

Figure 1: Historical map of the Gulf region

Source : https://www.lhistoire.fr/portfolio/larabie-avant-lislam

Although the peninsula was barely inhabited at the time, a number of fishing and pearl-trading towns sprang up.

The largest of these, Al Bida, was located near the present-day site of Doha. Until the 7th century AD, the main religion was Zoroastrianism, the official religion of the Sassanid Empire, but Qataris followed a variety of religions. Some embraced polytheistic beliefs, while others followed Judaism or Christianity. Despite the existence of historical evidence attesting to the presence of Christianity in pre-Islamic Qatar, very little archaeological evidence from this period remains, with the exception of the remains of a building identified as a Nestorian church in Al Wakrah.

In less than two decades after the death of Mohammed, almost all the inhabitants of the peninsula converted to Islam and played an important role in spreading the new religion beyond Arabia. Two great families succeeded one another at the head of the caliphate, which had authority over the inhabitants of Qatar, among others: the Umayyads of Damascus from 661 to 750, then the Abbasids of Baghdad from 750 to 1258, and Qatar seems to have prospered during the Abbasid era.

A strategic position coveted by Europeans

The fall of Baghdad in 1258, following the Mongol invasion led by Genghis Khan, marked the end of the Abbasid dynasty and triggered a struggle for control of Qatar involving the Persians, the Ottomans and the Portuguese. The latter took possession of the Strait of Hormuz in 1507.

The Portuguese, the first European colonisers

The region that includes Qatar came under the influence of European colonisers because of its position on their trade routes. In the early 16th century, the Portuguese established their dominance over the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. To secure their interests in the Gulf, the Portuguese built forts and sent warships. This gave them control over trade and navigation.

Many coastal sites in eastern Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain still have the remains of Portuguese forts. In Qatar, on the other hand, there are no notable Portuguese ruins. This fact, along with the fact that the Qatar peninsula was often omitted from maps drawn at the time and is not mentioned in visitors’ reports, has led researchers to believe that it was deserted by its inhabitants in the 16th century.

The advance of British control

For most of the 16th and 17th centuries, the Portuguese were in conflict with various nations, including the Ottoman Empire, the Persians and the British, over control of the Gulf.

In 1650, Portugal was driven from its strongholds in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula was divided between the Ottomans and the British. Although the Ottomans claimed the whole of the Arabian Peninsula, their authority did not extend southwards. Great Britain, the dominant European power at the time, exercised greater control over the present-day countries of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Yemen. The British were interested in the Gulf because of their large colony in India. To keep the main trade routes between India and Britain open, they needed bases for their formidable fleet. Britain also wanted to prevent its European competitors, such as France, from gaining territory in the Gulf region.

The origins of the Qatari state

Tribalism as a mode of socio-economic organisation and the richness of the subsoil in hydrocarbons are the keys to understanding this former British protectorate. The importance of tribes is not specific to Qatar and is prevalent throughout the Arabian Peninsula, as Laure Masson analysed in her thesis on Dubai[9]. In this arid environment, borders have no meaning for the nomadic tribes whose chiefs, the sheikhs, have shifting alliances. Against this backdrop of desert and poverty, hydrocarbons opened up a new era in the history of the country, which became rich, modernised and became a modern state.

The importance of tribes

At the beginning of the 18th century, a tribe of nomadic Bedouins, the Bani Utub (singular Bani Utba), left the heart of the Arabian Peninsula to settle on the shores of the Persian Gulf.

 

Figure 2: The Bani Utub migrations

Based on https://fanack.com/bahrain/history-of-bahrain/bahrain-the-british-since-the-seventeenth-century/

Figure 2 shows the successive migrations of the Bani Utub from the Nedj. Their first settlement was in present-day Kuwait, where they discovered an abundance of fish and pearl oysters. The tribe was divided into three main clans, the Al Sabah, the Al Khalifa and the Al Jalahima, who shared responsibility for the colony, with the Al Jalahima in charge of fishing, the Al Khalifa in charge of the pearl trade and the Al Sabah in charge of administration.

The Al Khalifa and Al Jalahima chose to migrate to other locations in the 1760s, leaving Kuwait to settle on the north coast of the Qatar peninsula, where they founded Zubarah. The new community, which maintained links with Kuwait, quickly developed into an important centre for trade and pearling.

When Omani forces stationed in Bahrain attacked Zubarah in the 1780s, in response the Qatari and Kuwaiti Bani Utub families joined forces and conquered Bahrain. The Al Khalifas took control of the island and formed a dynasty that still rules Bahrain today.

This gave the Al Jalahima the opportunity to take control of the Qatar peninsula. They moved to another part of the Qatari coast where they established a new community, Al Khuwayr, under the leadership of Rahman ibn Jabir al-Jalahima. They used it as a base from which to target ships from Iran and Bahrain, and Rahman ibn Jabir soon became one of the most feared pirates in the region. However, the Al Sabahs of Kuwait shifted their trade to Bahrain and the importance of Zubarah (which remained under the authority of the Al Khalifas) and Al Khuwayr diminished. The Qatar peninsula quickly became insignificant and sparsely inhabited. To defend themselves against Bedouin incursions, the few remaining inhabitants built walls and forts around their settlements.

Towards a British protectorate

In the early 19th century, the British were determined to put an end to piracy and secure the region they called the Pirate Coast. In 1820, Britain signed a peace agreement with the sheikhs, or tribal chiefs, who lived along the coast of the Arabian Peninsula. In exchange for protection from the Ottomans or other countries, the tribal chiefs were supposed to fight pirates and give Britain a role in their relations with other nations.

Antagonism with Bahrain

The British considered Qatar to be part of the « sheikhdom »[10] of Bahrain ruled by the Al Khalifas and did not bother to negotiate a separate contract with the tribal chiefs of the Qatar peninsula. They were therefore caught unawares when pirates based in Doha attacked British ships in 1821. In retaliation, the British sent warships to the region and bombarded Doha. Intermittent conflicts continued over the next five decades.

In 1867, a Bahraini army sacked Doha and Al Wakrah. Following a Qatari offensive on Bahrain, the British decided to reach an agreement. Colonel Lewis Pelly, Britain’s political agent in the region, negotiated a peace agreement that recognised Qatar for the first time as a political entity independent of Bahrain.

« Mohammad bin Thani, from the Al Maadheed tribe, linked to the Banu Tamim, became the spokesman for the Qatari people »[11]. In the eyes of the British, this member of a powerful Bedouin clan originally from the Nedj and now established in Qatar was the true sovereign of the Qatari peninsula. The descendants of Muhammad ibn Thani ibn Muhammad still rule Qatar today, as can be seen from the table listing the Al Thani rulers and the dates of their reigns.

Table 1: The Al Thani dynasty

Under the leadership of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Thani, his clan moved from Fuwairat to Doha in 1847 and gradually extended its control from the north of the Qatari peninsula to the whole of the peninsula in the mid-1860s, concluding agreements with the Saudi Emir Faisal bin Turki in 1851 to strengthen its influence. In September 1868, Sheikh Muhammad ibn Thani « signed the peace agreement proposed by Colonel Pelly[12], promising to reside in peace in Doha, to submit any disputes to the British Resident and to maintain good relations with ‘Alî ibn Khalîfa, Shaykh of Bahrain »[13].

In July 1872, against his father’s advice, his son Jassim ibn Muhammad Al-Thani wanted to come under the sovereignty of the Turks, who had just seized the oases of al-Hasa, in what is now the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. Jassim relied on the Turks to safeguard Qatar’s interests. He submitted to Ottoman control and was given the Ottoman title of Qaim-Maqam, which means deputy governor. The Turks set about strengthening their position on the Qatar peninsula. They placed Turkish administrators in Zubara, Doha, Wakrah and Khor al-Udaid. They reinforced their garrison in Doha.

Following a pragmatic policy, as his descendants do to this day, « Jassim Al-Thani accommodated both the Ottomans and the British, using the former to moderate the ardour and influence of the latter, and vice versa »[14]. However, there were persistent disagreements between the Ottomans and Sheikh Jassim, who led a campaign and defeated the Turkish soldiers in 1893 at al-Wajbah, fifteen kilometres west of Doha. Pushed out of Qatar, the Ottomans retained nominal jurisdiction over the region, but lost all influence over the territory.In 1913, when the Turks abandoned their claims to the Qatari peninsula and Sheikh Abdullah ibn Jassim succeeded his father as Emir of Qatar, the British recognised him as sovereign. « Faced with Saudi expansionism, the British entered into negotiations with Ibn Saud, which led in 1915 to a treaty in which the latter agreed not to interfere in the internal politics of the emirates linked to Great Britain.  Qatar was therefore protected by the British »[15].

Two protectorate treaties with the United Kingdom

In 1916, Sheikh Abdullah concluded a pact with the United Kingdom, similar to those concluded by the British with the other coastal emirates, the Trucial States. Qatar agreed to cede control of its foreign policy to Great Britain in exchange for protection against invasion and British support for the Al Thani dynasty. A second treaty, concluded in 1935, reaffirmed the power of the British protectorate in Qatar. Until the First World War, Qatar’s importance to the British was to control maritime routes: « as we recognise that our interests in the Katr peninsula are purely confined to the maintenance of order along it coasts and on the adjacents seas… »[16]. During the 20th century, Britain’s interest in Qatar persisted, but became linked to the country’s hydrocarbon wealth.

The hydrocarbon challenge

The Anglo-Persian Oil Corporation was created in 1909, one year after the discovery of an oil deposit in Iran in 1908. This company, which was controlled by the British government from 1914 onwards given the strategic as well as economic interest of oil, was not only interested in Iran. It also turned its attention to the Arab territories of the Gulf. In 1935, the year in which the British presence in Qatar was consolidated as mentioned in the previous paragraph, an onshore concession was granted by Sheikh Abdullah ibn Jassim to Anglo-Persian Oil C°. The first field discovered was productive in 1940.

As a result of the Second World War, the first barrel was not exported until 1949, via the port of Umm Said in the south of the country, where tankers had access to deep water. On 5 August 1949, Sheikh Abdullah ibn Jassim signed an offshore concession with the London-based Central Mining and Investment Corporation Ltd and the American Superior Oil Company, the first sign that the United States, already an ally of the Saudis, was strengthening its power in the Gulf. A few days later, on 20 August, Sheikh Abdullah abdicated in favour of his son Sheikh Ali ibn Abdullah Al Thani. A new phase had begun for Qatar.

The refusal of a federal solution after the British withdrawal from East Suez

Although the rulers of the Arab Gulf coast from Qatar to Oman were content with the security offered by their agreements with the British, Britain eventually concluded that with Indian independence it had lost the main reason for its involvement in the Persian Gulf region. In January 1968, Harold Wilson, the Labour Prime Minister, announced that all British troops would be withdrawn from east of Suez. The British would be released from their treaty obligations in the Persian Gulf region within three years. « Withdrawn from Aden […], British forces, according to the Labour government’s austerity plans, should be out of the Persian Gulf by 1971 » [17].

The original intention of Great Britain, which had in mind the precedent of the decolonisation of Malaysia, was that Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States (the seven emirates that make up today’s United Arab Emirates) should merge to form a federal Arab state.

Important documents, in Arabic and English, on this federal project are to be found in the Emirati archives. They are appended to this thesis in a French translation (annexe ???). These archives show that on 28 February 1968, Sheikh Zayed Ben Sultan Al Nahyan, Governor of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, and Sheikh Rached ben Said Al Maktoum, Governor of the Emirate of Dubai, simultaneously signed an « Agreement on the Union of the Two Emirates: Abu Dhabi and Dubai » and an « Agreement on the Settlement of the Maritime Boundaries between Abu Dhabi and Dubai ». The two governors, future President and Vice-President of the United Arab Emirates, both come from the powerful Bani Yas tribal confederation, the first from the Al Bu Falah branch, the second from the Al Bu Falasah branch. The same day also saw the signing of an « Agreement for the creation of a federation comprising nine States to be known as the Arab Emirates » between the nine governors of the British protectorates, the sheikhs of the traditional system, including Sheikh Ahmed ben Ali Al Thani, Governor of Qatar.

The idea of a federation of nine states soon collapsed, as the various leaders were unable to agree on how to distribute power in such a scenario, and some had no intention of merging into a federation. Bahrain was the first to declare independence in August 1971, followed by Qatar on 3 September 1971. The new nation soon joined the United Nations and the Arab League.

Settling the bilateral dispute with Bahrain

As mentioned above, there were tensions between the Al Thani of Qatar and the Al Khalifa of Bahrain, and the British arbitrated disputes between the sheikhs. With independence, the disputes had to be settled to officially establish the borders, which had remained vague. This may seem surprising given that Bahrain is an island and therefore an easy territory to delimit geographically. But Bahrain had historical claims to part of Qatar and to a small archipelago very close to the Qatari coast, as can be seen on the map below.

Figure 3: The location of disputes between Qatar and Bahrain

This also concerned the delimitation of maritime borders. The issue was complex because the power of the sheikhs was based on tribal allegiances and not on territorial treaties. The dispute concerned both the northwest of the Qatari peninsula which faces Bahrain and especially Hawar Island and the neighboring islets. To resolve these cross-claims where Qatar claims the Hawar Islands and Bahrain the Zubarah region, Qatar has chosen negotiation and mediation rather than conflict by taking the matter to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

Zubarah’s question

Zubarah is no longer inhabited today and it is an archaeological site classified by UNESCO. It was founded around 1760 by the Al Khalifah from Kuwait who left for Bahrain in 1783, then destroyed by the Al Thani in 1878 following incessant conflicts with the Al Naïm. “Feared for its warlike acts, this tribal group acquired a reputation as opponents of the Al Thani until 1937. On the other hand, its allegiance to the rulers of Bahrain, the Al Khalifah, is admitted for the period from approximately 1867 to 1950 […]. As a result, the Al Khalifah have continually claimed this territorial area. »[18]. While the control of the entire Qatari peninsula by the Al Thani was gradually strengthened from 1898, was confirmed in the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913 and has been acquired without contest since the end of the 1930s, Bahrain is relaunching its claim on Zubarah to the International Court of Justice which unanimously rejects this request.[19] But the main dispute concerns the Hawar archipelago.

The Hawar Islands

Hawar and the neighboring islets form an archipelago with a total area of 52 km2. Only the largest island which gives its name to the archipelago is inhabited. Two villages of the Dawasir tribe, who left Saudi Arabia for Bahrain in 1845, settled there in the 19th century. Qatar claims these islands in the name of geographical proximity. They are located 1.9 km from its western coast while they are 19 km from Bahrain as seen in Figure 2. Bahrain claims in the name of historical legitimacy to have exercised its sovereignty without interruption over these islands for two centuries, which was confirmed by a questionable British arbitration in 1939.

During Saudi mediation, the two leaders of Bahrain and Qatar, which have become independent, were unable to find a compromise. After the failure of this mediation, Qatar took the question to the International Court of Justice in 1991. After ten years of arguments, negotiations and debates by jurists on this complex case, the Hawar Islands were allocated to Bahrain by the majority of judges in 2001[20].

On the other hand, the Fasht al Dibal shoal is allocated to Qatar, which thus recovers territorial waters where the enormous North Dome offshore gas field will be discovered. Although the decisions of the International Court of Justice are final, Bahrain, twenty years later, claims this sandbank and calls into question the decisions of 2001.[21]

The Hawar Islands are not the only dispute over island territories in the Gulf. I will only mention that which concerns Abou Moussa, an oil island of 90 km2 and the islets of Petite Tomb and Grande Tomb. The Iranians support their claims on an 1892 map from the Royal Geographical Society which attributes these highly strategic islands near the Strait of Hormuz to them. The Qawassim (plural of Qasimi), a large maritime tribe from which the sheikhs of Sharjah and Ras el Khaïmah come, also claim these islands. In the 1960s, the United Kingdom assigned Abu Musa to its protectorate of Sharjah[22] and the two Tombs to its protectorate of Ras el Khaimah. On the UAE’s Independence Day, Iran established military installations on the three islands with the consent of its American ally. Following the Islamic Revolution, Iran has unilaterally occupied the three islands since 1992. Emirati archives show that the moderate position of Qatar, which has no dispute with Iran and which judges « that it would be preferable to settle the disputes in peace in order to guarantee the security and stability of the region »[23] contrasts with the more threatening one, despite diplomatic language, of Saudi Arabia which « surprised by the actions of Iran which used force to occupy the three islands (…) hopes that Iran will reconsider its position”[24]. Saudi Arabia has long seen in this latent conflict that the United Arab Emirates does not wish to inflame a pretext to clash with Iran, considering that the issue is the responsibility of all the Arab states bordering the Gulf.

The difficult choices of alliances at the time of Independence

Qatar was not powerful enough at the time of its independence to ensure its security alone. It has strained relations with Bahrain which had had closer ties with the British. But Bahrain’s oil production, never very high, peaked in 1970, then declined from that date due to the exhaustion of the deposits. In addition, Dubai, closer to the Strait of Hormuz and where oil was discovered in the 1960s, has a port and an airport. Under the leadership of Al Maktoum, this emirate, which is integrated into the United Arab Emirates, begins its rise to become the major commercial platform of the region to the detriment of Bahrain.

Bahrain’s loss of power reduces the risk of open conflict with Qatar. It is above all between the two regional powers, Saudi Arabia and Iran, both allies of the Americans at that time, that Qatar must find its place, not to mention the rise in power of Abu Dhabi, the main emirate of the United Arab Emirates.

Figure 4: The geographical position of Qatar, between Saudi Arabia and Iran

Source : https://cafe-geo.net/geopolitique-de-la-peninsule-arabique-une-situation-explosive/

Iran at this time was set to become a major economic power. It is also a military power which modernized its army from 1955 and intensified this modernization in the 1960s. “The Iranian armed forces will have a remarkable size and degree of qualification compared to other countries in the region (… ). »[25] The Iranian army “possessed the most sophisticated offensive and defensive weapons of the time.”[26] Iranian claims over Bahrain and Iran’s occupation of the islands of Great Tomb, Little Tomb and Abu Moussa could only make Qatar suspicious of this powerful ally of the United States.

Relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia are complicated. One might think that the two neighbors are automatically allies. Indeed, the Al Thani dynasty comes from the Banu Tamim, a prestigious tribe from which the religious reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of Wahhabism and support of Saud, also comes. Both countries are predominantly Wahhabi and in 1902 Jassim ibn Mohammad Al-Thani sought the alliance of Ibn Saud to defend himself against the Emir of Abu Dhabi, Maliki and enemy of the Wahhabis. But relations between Ibn Saud and Qatar deteriorated and on the eve of the Second World War, Ibn Saud intended to annex Qatar to his kingdom. Already under the Second Saudi State (1824-1891) the Sauds demanded that the inhabitants of Qatar pay them tribute and encountered resistance from the tribes of the Qatari peninsula. Thus, Qatar had to defend itself from Saudi attacks and the pretensions of this expansionist neighbor, as we see in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Saudi border claims in the 20th century

According to Ch. Dallaporta, “Institutional and political transfers in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi”, Foreign Policy, No. 6, 1974.

Given the tensions with its Saudi neighbor over the borders of its territory, Qatar is not in favor of an alliance with Saudi Arabia’s traditional ally.

In a territorial configuration between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two « pillars » of the United States’ strategy in the Gulf, there exists for Qatar an alternative, or at least a counterweight, to the alliance with the Anglo-West. Saxon: France.

Reluctance towards the Anglo-Saxon West
The British

During the protectorate period, the British played a double game with Qatar. We see this on the question of the Hawar Islands with the arbitration of 1939. This arbitration was made following exchanges of letters in 1938 between on the one hand the Sheikh of Qatar and the British political agent following the occupation of Hawar, then uninhabited, by Bahrain in 1937 and on the other hand the Sheikh of Bahrain and the British political agent. In 1939, the British sovereign informed the two Gulf sovereigns that the islands belonged to Bahrain.

Bahrain considers that it is an arbitral award, that is to say a decision of a group of arbitrators which is binding on both parties. Qatar has a different point of view since there was no compromise accepted by the two parties and it was the King of England, whose role it was not, who unilaterally fixed the borders between its two protectorates. But it is because of this colonial decision that the Hawar were awarded to Bahrain in 2001. In reality, the 1939 arbitration was not a decision of international law, but a geopolitical decision.

The British have always favored Bahrain and took a long time, as we saw above, to consider Qatar as an independent territory of Bahrain. “Bahrain, favored by its fresh water sources, was throughout the 19th century the privileged partner of British influence, constituting a flourishing stopover and an essential strategic point on the route to India. The discovery of oil on its territory in 1925 only increased the importance of Bahrain. […] While Great Britain had been represented since 1823 by a Political Resident, responsible for the entire Gulf, to whom Political Agents in the various emirates were subordinate, this post was created in Bahrain in 1900, but only in 1949 in Qatar . »[27]

There is therefore bitterness towards the British in Qatar where they did not leave a good memory and whose inhabitants they treated with contempt. However, due to the length of the British presence in the region and the role of English oil companies in Qatar’s oil history, historical ties between the two countries were not severed after independence and the United Kingdom remained a partner for Qatar, not only in the commercial field, but also politically and militaryly. But Qatar does not give them a monopoly on its geopolitical alliances, especially since the United Kingdom, which lost its Empire, has also lost its economic and strategic power.

United States

After the Second World War, Europe was weakened and two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, asserted themselves. The two greats and their allies form the two camps of the Cold War, a period of tensions without direct armed confrontation between the two superpowers, but with crises in external theaters of intervention (Cuba, Berlin, Korea). In this context, it was vital for the West, because of their oil supply and because of the strategic position of the Arabian Peninsula, that this part of the Middle East did not fall under Soviet influence.

« As the United Kingdom gradually withdrew from the Gulf region in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States became reluctant to make new security commitments, particularly because it was stuck in Vietnam. The White House then sought to rely on regional allies, a policy which became widespread under the title of “Nixon Doctrine”. Indeed, from 1969, President Nixon decided to reduce American military commitment in the world […] In the Gulf, this implies counting on Saudi Arabia and Iran as “twin pillars” (Twin Pillars ) regional security. »[28] .

Qatar, at that time, was not at all considered a power or a potential ally by the Americans. It is a new state, small in size, sparsely populated and much less wealthy than its neighbors. If we take World Bank statistics as a source, in 1971 Qatar had barely more than 100,000 inhabitants and its GDP was $387 million. Its oil production is 430,000 barrels per day according to the British Petroleum statistical directory. According to the same sources, Saudi Arabia, in the year of Qatar’s independence, had a population of more than 6 million inhabitants, a GDP that exceeded 7 billion dollars and produced 4.8 million barrels of oil per day. Iran in the same year produces 4.5 million barrels of oil per day, its GDP amounts to 13 billion dollars and it has 29 million inhabitants. Although the United States opened an embassy in Doha in 1973, its relations with Qatar did not flourish until the 1990s.

The Saudi pillar

When Qatar became independent, the American-Saudi alliance was already forty-five years old. In 1926, Ibn Saud dethroned the Hashemites of Mecca. He is recognized as king of Hedjaz and sultan of Nedjd and its dependencies. In 1932, he united these territories and founded the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Americans immediately recognized the new state. In 1933, an agreement was signed between Saudi Arabia and the Standard Oil Company of California which obtained a monopoly on oil prospecting and exploitation. Drilling began in 1935 and commercial exploitation in 1938. Washington then supported private American interests and the oil company which would take the name Aramco (Arabian American Oil Company). A United States legation opened in Jeddah in 1942, then an embassy in 1949.

But the most important event occurred in 1945 when the King of Saudi Arabia and President Franklin Roosevelt met aboard the cruiser USS Quincy: the Saudis were assured of American military support in the event of a threat and the United States of control of petroleum resources. This is a major geopolitical turning point insofar as it signifies the arrival of a new leading actor in the region, the United States, which now considers that the stability of the Arabian Peninsula is one of its vital interests.

Figure 6: The meeting between the American president and the founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia aboard the Quincy.

Thus, while the British established themselves in the region from the coasts and through the action of their diplomats to secure the route to India, the Americans established themselves through their powerful oil companies, relying on the Saudi Arabia for energy and indirectly geostrategic reasons to ensure the security of oil routes.

The Iranian Pillar

On the other side of the Gulf, the Americans have another ally, Iran. In the 19th century, Persia, the former name of Iran, had a border with Russia and one with India in a context of clash of Russian and British imperialisms. After three Russo-Persian wars, Iran lost several territories as seen in Figure 6. Preserving the independence of Persia from Russia is essential in the eyes of the United Kingdom for the security of its Indian empire. [29]. At the beginning of the 20th century, the country was divided between a zone of Russian influence centered on the Caspian and a zone of English influence centered on the Gulf coast, relying on the tribes of Baluchistan, as shown in the map below. below.

Borders and zones of influence in Persia

Reza Shah, founder of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925, sought to escape the influence of the British. The latter control oil through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the new name of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company which also had interests in Qatar as we saw above. It also seeks to counter the influence of the USSR with which it has a long border and which supports the Azeri and Kurdish secessionist movements. To modernize his country, he appealed to the Germans and the French.

Reza Shah’s proximity to Nazi Germany led to his overthrow by the Anglo-Americans for the benefit of his son in 1941. In 1971, upon the independence of Qatar, Iran was still governed by Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, son of Reza Shah. He is an openly pro-American sovereign. You should know that in 1951, Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh nationalized the Iranian oil industry which had been controlled by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company since 1913. This caused tensions with the British. His desire to put an end to British interference in Iranian politics led to a conflict with the Shah who went into exile in 1953. A few days after his departure, Operation Ajax, led by the Americans in consultation with the English, removed the Prime Minister and the Shah returned.

We made this little reminder because the Iranian case shows two things:

– the geopolitics of the region was guided in the 19th century by the desire for territorial conquests. It was dictated by oil interests in the following century.

– the Gulf region which was the preserve of the British became that of their American allies after the Second World War.

Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran borders the Strait of Hormuz through which oil tankers pass. It is also the state with the longest coastline on the Gulf. On the Arab side, the strait is bordered by the Sultanate of Oman. In 1971, it was a very poor country and still devoid of hydrocarbons. Sultan Said ibn Taïmour, hostile to reforms and modernization, was dethroned in favor of his son Qaboos at the instigation of the British, who were still very influential in the country. For the Americans, it is obvious that their strategic ally in the Gulf is Iran, the “policeman of the Gulf”.[30]

The United States’ strategy encompasses the entire Gulf and not just the two regional powers. For Qatar, which at that time was not a military power and did not have weapons, it seemed difficult to escape the “American umbrella”. But the bipolar world of the beginnings of the Cold War begins to break up and new powers appear or more precisely reappear: Japan on the economic level and France on the diplomatic and military level.

The French alternative

Since the 1970s, on a global scale, geopolitics is no longer just an ideological confrontation between the West and the communist world. The relationship between oil exporting countries and consuming countries must be taken into account. Qatar belongs to the first category and must use oil revenues for its development. France belongs to the second category and has technologies and skills that Qatar needs. It is therefore a profitable partnership for both parties.

France, a major power in 1971

Raymond Aron defines power as “the capacity of a political unit to impose its will on other units”. “It is therefore both a question of a State being able to guarantee its freedom of action, and of being able to influence the behavior of others in the direction of its interests” [31]. Power is measured by several criteria: demographic power, economic power, technological power, military power. We also consider food independence and energy independence as well as political influence and cultural influence.

On January 1, 1971, France had 51 million inhabitants and it was the fifth most populous country in Europe. From 1945 to 1970, France experienced the most rapid period of growth in its history, called the Trente Glorieuses. Its growth was 6% per year in the early 1970s. France had the highest GDP in Europe after Germany. It was the fourth largest exporter in the world and had a foreign trade surplus.

France had modernized its agriculture, which allowed it to have food security and to export agro-food products. As its traditional industries, steel and textiles, were in crisis, it developed its cutting-edge industries, in particular civil and military aeronautics as well as the space industry, civil and military nuclear power, but also the oil services industry. France was already the world’s second largest exporter of petroleum technology behind the United States.[32] It was therefore a technologically advanced nation. In addition, it had competitive companies capable of contributing to the development of Qatar in the field of transport infrastructure thanks to its large public works companies. It can be concluded that France was a solid partner capable of meeting Qatar’s development needs in several areas.

In terms of energy, France had relative independence thanks to hydroelectricity, developed at the beginning of the 20th century, and the prospects for nuclear electricity production. In 1955, a joint project between the CEA and Electricité de France (EDF) was launched to develop the first entirely French nuclear reactor, Marcoule, and in 1963 a first commercial reactor was connected to the Chinon network. Ten years later, after the oil crisis, the French government chose nuclear energy. Indeed, France exploited very little hydrocarbons on its soil. However, it owned one of the major multinational companies in the sector, the Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP) which later became Total, and a research center with global influence, the French Petroleum Institute (IFP). It was therefore an asset for the development of relations with Qatar.

French coal mines were beginning to run out. They provided energy, but were also used for chemistry. The national company Charbonnages de France (CdF) had converted to chemicals. This gave it expertise in fertilizers and plastics and fit with Qatar’s plan to develop a petrochemicals industry. CdF – chemistry is chronologically one of the first French industrial partners of Qatar.

France’s politics of grandeur

In the name of a “certain idea of France, General de Gaulle defined two priorities: on the one hand, France must be independent of external influences, and maintain its freedom of maneuver in matters of foreign policy whatever happens. , on the other hand, France aims to pursue a foreign policy on a global scale. »[33]

For General de Gaulle, “the conduct of France’s affairs in international matters precludes it from allowing itself to be taken in tow by anyone from outside. »[34] and he considers that France was wrong in the interwar period to lose the initiative by making its foreign policy dependent on the agreement of the British. Its foreign policy is based on clear principles: national independence; the right of peoples to self-determination; the need to create a multipolar world instead of the bipolar world of the Cold War. These principles are shared by Qatar. Furthermore, just as Qatar does not reject the « American umbrella », France does not wish to break with the Atlanticist camp despite the Franco-American quarrels.

General de Gaulle, who understood the importance of emerging countries, developed an active Arab policy[35] after the Six Day War of 1967. We can say that his successor Georges Pompidou, president from 1969, is his heir for foreign policy and that France will take advantage of the Gaullian heritage to establish itself in the new Gulf states. Qatar will move closer to France, which for its part is looking for new markets and wants to assert itself in the Middle East. Indeed, it not only has a geographical and historical proximity with the Maghreb, but also in the Arab East, old and privileged links with Lebanon and Syria. On the other hand, until now it has had little presence in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf, whose wealth in hydrocarbons has modified its geopolitical weight, because oil, which has taken the region from poverty to wealth, can become a weapon. by playing on production and crude oil prices. We will see it two years later with the oil crisis of 1973.

The diplomatic power and the military power of France are linked. French military policy is an instrument serving France’s foreign policy. France remains one of the world’s leading military powers. In 1960, it carried out the first tests of a nuclear bomb in the Sahara that it developed with its own scientific resources. Having nuclear weapons gives it a deterrent force which protects it from both the Soviet threat and American hegemony[36]. France also has a powerful arms industry and can provide Qatar with the quality weapons it needs to ensure its security. Thanks to its renowned military schools, it can also train executives of the Qatari army, its officers and its technicians.

In 1972, Qatar opened an embassy in Paris and France an embassy in Doha. While in the early 1970s, small states sought the protection of the American hyperpower, Qatar’s strategy was to avoid too much dependence on its former colonial power, which was losing ground, and especially on the United States. While not rejecting the American alliance, Qatar is turning to France which has many assets and occupies an important place in the world. This is the beginning of a close relationship between the two countries which have common interests and convergences of points of view.

Conclusion

To the question of why the new State, instead of turning to its former colonial power or to the United States, developed its ties with France, we can answer that several factors contributed to the birth of a privileged relationship with France from the start of Qatar’s independence. The main ones are:

– Cross-interests: Qatar’s need for strategic security versus France’s need for energy security; Qatar’s need for technology and infrastructure versus France’s need for markets and contracts.

– In the words of a Qatari academic: « compatibility and coherence between the two countries’ foreign policies and convergent positions on many international issues, the meeting of Qatar and France on a great many political subjects » [37]. A French diplomat put it another way: « France and Qatar share powerful common values: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States, open diplomacy that allows discussions with all international players, and a desire to build balanced long-term partnerships. Both countries see themselves as balanced powers ». [38] The two countries are united in their rejection of a bipolar world in favour of a multipolar world, and in their desire to pursue an autonomous foreign policy.

–Qatar’s reticence towards the British and the Americans for reasons linked to history and regional geopolitics, given its relations with Bahrain and its proximity to Saudi Arabia and Iran. This prompted the new state to diversify its alliances, while France took advantage of a certain lack of interest on the part of the United States, following the analysis of a French businessman: « While the USA was only interested in oil (gas resources were not well identified at the time) and is not interested in Qatar, France saw the opportunity to create an important partnership in an area where it had little presence and to be able to participate in the country’s development. »[39]

– France’s demographic, economic, technological and military power at the end of the 1960s; the continuation of General de Gaulle’s foreign policy and Arab policy by the President of the Republic who succeeded him. « It should be remembered that France is one of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council and that its influence is universal », as a Qatari diplomat points out[40], while one of my French interlocutors considers that the political aim of Qatari diplomacy towards France is « to be able to benefit from a major player who is a member of the Security Council »[41].

To sum up, we can say that Qatar has benefited from France’s support as part of a win-win partnership, in a Middle Eastern context where France’s interests « are defended by a visible French presence, heir to the « Arab policy » spurred on by General de Gaulle in the 1960s and which aimed tò put right the strained relations between France and the Arab countries. This policy enabled̀ France to regain a foothold in the region as an alternative power between the two Cold War blocs by offering unconditional support to certain Arab regimes in order to secure access to energy resources and find an outlet for the French arms industry. »[42]

 

references

[1] Alexandre Sheldon-Duplaix, « Iran, gendarme of the Gulf? », in : DSI (Défense et Sécurité Internationale), N^o 146 (Mars – Avril 2020), pp. 42-49 (8 pages)

[2] What does the notion of power cover in international relations?

https://www.vie-publique.fr/fiches/269789-que-recouvre-la-notion-de-puissance-en-relations internationales

[3] https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/ressources-en-hydrocarbures-france

[4] https://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/lhomme/dossiers-thematiques/place-de-france-monde-1944-1969/

[5] Jacques Vernant, « General de Gaulle and foreign policy » in Politique étrangère, n°6 – 1970. pp. 619-629, consulté en ligne sur https://www.persee.fr/doc/polit_0032-342x_1970_num_35_6_2077

[6] Paul-Marie de La Gorce, « General de Gaulle’s Arab policy », in : La Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, sous la direction de Élie Barnavi et Saul Friedländer, Presses Universitaires de France, 1985

[7] André Eshet, «Strategic aspects of Gaullian foreign policy », in : La Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, sous la direction de Élie Barnavi et Saul Friedländer, Presses Universitaires de France, 1985

[8] Interview in February 2023 with a Qatari academic specializing in political science

[9] Interview in October 2022 with a French diplomat

[10] Interview in February 2023 with a French businessman who previously held military and diplomatic functions.

[11] Interview in October 2022 with a Qatari diplomat

[12] Interview cited in note 33

[13] Héloïse Fayet, “What strategic posture for France in the Middle East? », IFRI Studies, November 2022

[14] A detailed summary in French of relations between Iran and the United Kingdom can be found in Shahâb Vahdati, “Return to bilateral relations between Iran and Great Britain from the Safavid era to the present day”, in : The Tehran Review, No. 124, March 2016

[15] Quote from Emmanuel Decaux, see note 11

[16] Steven Ekovich, “Saudi Arabia and the United States: an ambivalent and lasting alliance”, in: Confluences Méditerranée, 2016/2 (No. 97), pp. 101 to 116

[17]Mohammad-Reza Djalili, “The army and politics: the case of Iran”, Cahiers d’Études sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien, year 1999, No. 27

[18] Ibid.

Iran at this time was set to become a major economic power. It is also a military power which modernized its army from 1955 and intensified this modernization in the 1960s. “The Iranian armed forces will have a remarkable size and degree of qualification compared to other countries in the region (… ). »[19] The Iranian army “possessed the most sophisticated offensive and defensive weapons of the time.”[20] Iranian claims on Bahrain and the occupation of the islands of Great Tomb, Little Tomb and Abu Moussa by Iran could only make Qatar suspicious of this powerful ally of the United States.

Relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia are complicated. One might think that the two neighbors are automatically allies. Indeed, the Al Thani dynasty comes from the Banu Tamim, a prestigious tribe from which the religious reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of Wahhabism and support of Saud, also comes. Both countries are predominantly Wahhabi and in 1902 Jassim ibn Mohammad Al-Thani sought the alliance of Ibn Saud to defend himself against the Emir of Abu Dhabi, Maliki and enemy of the Wahhabis. But relations between Ibn Saud and Qatar deteriorated and on the eve of the Second World War, Ibn Saud intended to annex Qatar to his kingdom. Already under the Second Saudi State (1824-1891) the Sauds demanded that the inhabitants of Qatar pay them tribute and encountered resistance from the tribes of the Qatari peninsula. Thus, Qatar had to defend itself from Saudi attacks and the pretensions of this expansionist neighbor, as we see in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Saudi border claims in the 20th century

[21] Mohammad-Reza Djalili, “The army and politics: the case of Iran”, Cahiers d’Études sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien, year 1999, No. 27

[22] Ibidem

Iran at this time was set to become a major economic power. It is also a military power which modernized its army from 1955 and intensified this modernization in the 1960s. “The Iranian armed forces will have a remarkable size and degree of qualification compared to other countries in the region (… ). »[23] The Iranian army “possessed the most sophisticated offensive and defensive weapons of the time.”[24] Iranian claims on Bahrain and the occupation of the islands of Great Tomb, Little Tomb and Abu Moussa by Iran could only make Qatar suspicious of this powerful ally of the United States.

Relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia are complicated. One might think that the two neighbors are automatically allies. Indeed, the Al Thani dynasty comes from the Banu Tamim, a prestigious tribe from which the religious reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of Wahhabism and support of Saud, also comes. Both countries are predominantly Wahhabi and in 1902 Jassim ibn Mohammad Al-Thani sought the alliance of Ibn Saud to defend himself against the Emir of Abu Dhabi, Maliki and enemy of the Wahhabis. But relations between Ibn Saud and Qatar deteriorated and on the eve of the Second World War, Ibn Saud intended to annex Qatar to his kingdom. Already under the Second Saudi State (1824-1891) the Sauds demanded that the inhabitants of Qatar pay them tribute and encountered resistance from the tribes of the Qatari peninsula. Thus, Qatar had to defend itself from Saudi attacks and the pretensions of this expansionist neighbor, as we see in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Saudi border claims in the 20th century

[25]Mohammad-Reza Djalili, “The army and politics: the case of Iran”, Cahiers d’Études sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien, year 1999, No. 27

[26] Ibidem

Iran at this time was set to become a major economic power. It is also a military power which modernized its army from 1955 and intensified this modernization in the 1960s. “The Iranian armed forces will have a remarkable size and degree of qualification compared to other countries in the region (… ). »[27] The Iranian army “possessed the most sophisticated offensive and defensive weapons of the time.”[28] Iranian claims over Bahrain and Iran’s occupation of the islands of Great Tomb, Little Tomb and Abu Moussa could only make Qatar suspicious of this powerful ally of the United States.

Relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia are complicated. One might think that the two neighbors are automatically allies. Indeed, the Al Thani dynasty comes from the Banu Tamim, a prestigious tribe from which the religious reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of Wahhabism and support of Saud, also comes. Both countries are predominantly Wahhabi and in 1902 Jassim ibn Mohammad Al-Thani sought the alliance of Ibn Saud to defend himself against the Emir of Abu Dhabi, Maliki and enemy of the Wahhabis. But relations between Ibn Saud and Qatar deteriorated and on the eve of the Second World War, Ibn Saud intended to annex Qatar to his kingdom. Already under the Second Saudi State (1824-1891) the Sauds demanded that the inhabitants of Qatar pay them tribute and encountered resistance from the tribes of the Qatari peninsula. Thus, Qatar had to defend itself from Saudi attacks and the pretensions of this expansionist neighbor, as we see in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Saudi border claims in the 20th century

[29] Annie Montigny-Kozlowska, “The places of identity of the Âl Naʻîm of Qatar”, in: Monde Arabe 1989/1 (No. 123), pp 132-143

[30] Emmanuel Decaux, “Case of maritime delimitation and territorial questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits (judgment of March 16, 2001 Qatar v. Bahrain)”, in: Annuaire Français de Droit International, year 2001 (47), pp . 177-240

[31] Ibid.

[32] Two articles from the French weekly Le Point discuss this affair: “Did Qatar rob Bahrain of billions of cubic meters of gas? » on 03/11/2021 and “Bahrain stripped by Qatar? An investigation opened in Manama » on 11/18/2021 by the same journalist who writes from Manama and does not present Qatar’s point of view. The titles despite the question marks and the contents of these articles are very hostile to Qatar, but they contain errors and quote the words of the lawyer mentioned in note 11 while distorting them.

[33] “Abu Musa Island belongs to Sharjah, and this has been confirmed on several occasions by the British government, and very clearly.” UAE Archives Document Memorandum on Abu Musa Island belonging to the Emirate of Sharjah, August 1971. 1971 FO 1016/913 pp 93-99.

[34] Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar on the occupation of the Gulf Islands by Iran, December 2, 1971. 1971 FCO 8/1776 pp 8-9.

[35] Statement issued by the Saudi Royal Court on the occupation of the Gulf Islands by Iran, December 2, 1971. 1971 FCO 8/1776 p. 66.

[36]Mohammad-Reza Djalili, “The army and politics: the case of Iran”, Cahiers d’Études sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien, year 1999, No. 27

[37] Ibid.

[38] Colonel Pelly was the “Political Resident in Persian Gulf”. He was based in Busheir on the Iranian coast.

[39]Anie Montigny-Kozlowska, “History and social changes in Qatar”, in Paul Bonnenfant (dir.), The Arabian Peninsula today. Volume II, Editions du CNRS

[40] Jérôme avandier, “Qatar: a will through the prism of history”, in: Confluences Méditerranée 2013/1 (No. 84), pp 17 -28

[41] ibid.

[42] Letter from Captain Prideaux to the British Resident

[43] Pierre Rondot, “With the withdrawal of British troops, the small sovereigns of the Persian Gulf are faced with difficult choices”, in Le Monde Diplomatique, March 1968

[44] This term, formed on the model of kingdom, has no equivalent in French. It is generally translated as emirate or principality.

[45] Jérôme Lavandier, “Qatar: a will through the prism of history”, in: Confluences Méditerranée 2013/1 (No. 84), pp 17 -28

[46] Laure Masson, Creating the city of Dubai: tribal power and urban planning facing the challenge of globalization, thesis under the direction of Fabrice Balanche, University of Lyon, 2021.

ric document is now on display at the Qatar National Library in Doha

[48] Jean Fourastié, The Thirty Glorious Years or the Invisible Revolution, Fayard, 1979

[3] Jacques Vernant, “General de Gaulle and foreign policy” in Foreign Policy, n°6 – 1970. pp. 619-629, consulted online at https://www.persee.fr/doc/polit_0032-342x_1970_num_35_6_2077

[49] Muhammad Abdul Nayeem, Qatar Prehistory and Protohistory from the Most Ancient Times, Hyderabad Publishers, 1998

[50] Jacques Tixier (dir.), French archaeological mission in Qatar 1976-77, 1977-78, 1980 and Prehistory in Qatar, 1988, Éditions du CNRS/ Ministry of Information of Qatar

[51] Frances Gillespie, Discovering Qatar, Medina Publishing Ltd, 2016

[52] Qatar News Agency, 2 mars 2022

[53] https://www.facebook.com/NMOQatar/videos/309489516336592/